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 ABSTRACT 
Merger Failures*
by Albert Banal-Estañol and Jo Seldeslachts 
This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the 
interaction between the pre-merger gathering of information and the post-
merger integration processes.  Rational managers acting in the interest of 
shareholders may still lead their firms into unsuccessfully integrated companies. 
Firms may agree to merge and may abstain from putting forth integration 
efforts, counting on the partners to adapt. We explain why mergers among 
partners with closer corporate cultures can have a lower success rate and why 
failures should be more frequent during economic booms, consistent with the 
empirical evidence. Our setup is a global game (integration process) in which 
players decide whether to participate (merger decision). We show that private 
signals need to be noisy enough in order to ensure equilibrium uniqueness. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Gescheiterte Fusionen 
In dieser Arbeit wird eine Erklärung vorgestellt für das Scheitern von Fusionen. 
Sie beruht auf einem Modell, das das Verhalten der fusionierenden Firmen vor 
der Fusion, wenn Erkundungen über den Partner eingeholt werden, und nach 
der Fusion, wenn sich die Unternehmensteile integrieren müssen, in den 
Mittelpunkt stellt. Manager können nach diesem Modell durch rationales 
Verhalten die fusionierte Firma in Verluste und schlechte Aktienwerte führen, 
obwohl sie eigentlich das Interesse der Aktionäre im Blick haben. Die Firmen 
stimmen einer Fusion zu, halten sich aber beim Voranbringen der 
Integrationsbemühungen zurück, da sie darauf zählen, dass sich die Partner 
anpassen. Wir erklären, warum Fusionen zwischen Partnern mit ähnlichen 
Unternehmenskulturen eine geringere Erfolgsrate haben können und warum 
Misserfolge häufiger während eines wirtschaftlichen Booms auftreten. Dies ist 
konsistent mit empirischen Ergebnissen. Unser Ausgangspunkt ist ein globales 
Spiel, in dem der Integrationsprozess dargestellt wird und die Spieler 
entscheiden, ob sie sich am Spiel beteiligen, d.h. der Fusion zustimmen. Wir 
zeigen, dass ein eindeutiges Gleichgewicht nur garantiert werden kann, wenn 
die privaten Informationen der fusionierenden Firmen, die dem Fusionspartner 
nicht bekannt sind, genügend unpräzise sind. 
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1 Introduction
A large number of mergers and acquisitions are unsuccessful. Over the last fifteen years,
43% of all merged firms worldwide reported lower profits than comparable non-merged
firms (Gugler et al. [13]).1 DaimlerChrysler, the outcome of the largest industrial merger
ever, for example, has only posted low or negative profits since its birth in 1998 — including
the biggest loss in German business history in 2001.2 The disappointing results of mergers
have been puzzling commentators and academics alike.
In the management literature, poor merger performance has often been connected to
unsuccessful integration of diﬀerent corporate cultures.3 Cultural diﬀerences, however, are
not enough to explain failures. First, firms seem to be aware of organisational diﬃculties
when taking merger decisions. DaimlerChrysler, for example, anticipated post-merger
challenges.4 Second, mergers between partners with closer corporate cultures sometimes
perform worse (Morosini et al. [22]). Cultural aﬃnity does not prevent mergers from
failing.
This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail while others succeed.
We build a theory that investigates the interaction between the pre-merger and the post-
merger processes. In the pre-merger period, firms collect information about the potential
synergy gains. If they then agree to merge, each firm decides to which extent it exerts
1Likewise, Ravenscraft and Scherer [25] find that operating income as a percentage of assets is con-
siderably lower for the merged businesses. Agrawal et al. [1] report that NYSE aquiring firms suﬀer a
statistically significant loss over the 5-year post-merger period. Porter [24] reveals in a longitudinal study
that 50% of merged firms divested later on.
2By mid 2004, the firm’s market value had fallen to less than half of the pre-merger combined value,
while rivals improved in the same period (The Economist, 09/02/2004). “DaimlerChrysler’s results are
totally unacceptable. Their CEO is the only one in the industry who’s still arguing that the merger was
a smart move." (Business Week, 02/2004).
3See Larsson and Finkelstein [19] for a recent survey.
4The DaimlerChrysler Merger Statement (1998) reports: “Although the management of Chrysler
and Daimler-Benz expects the merger will produce substantial synergies, the integration of two large
companies, incorporated in diﬀerent countries and with diﬀerent business cultures, presents significant
challenges".
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an integration eﬀort in the post-merger period. A more integrated company leads to a
higher realisation of the potential synergy gains.
We show that managers, although being rational and acting in the interest of their
shareholders, can lead their firms into an unsuccessfully integrated entity. At the same
time, we uncover some of the dangers of mergers among partners with close corporate
cultures. Furthermore, according to our explanation, failures should be more frequent
during economic booms, which is consistent with the empirical evidence (Harford [14]
and Gugler et al. [12]).
Our theory builds on three ingredients. First, firms posses some private information
about the potential synergy gains when making merger decisions. Indeed, the reaction of
the competitors, the economic fundamentals or the unknown strategic fit of the partners
make these gains, and therefore merger profitability, uncertain. Before merging, however,
prospective partners collect information. Although part of this information is shared,
another part remains private. Potential partners do not want to give out all their infor-
mation. If the merger does not materialise, for example, a firm could use this information
against the other when competing.5
Second, synergy realisation, and therefore merger performance, hinges upon the exer-
tion of costly integration eﬀorts. At the time of merging, firms have distinct cultures, but
can move towards a common corporate culture during the post-merger integration pro-
cess.6 These organisational adjustments are costly. Managers and employees may prefer
to maintain the old way of doing things — because of learning costs, inertia, etc.— and
resist adopting some of the partners’ practices (Carrillo and Gromb [9], and Hermalin
[16]). The degree of organisational integration determines the extent of synergy realisa-
5Full information disclosure may also violate competition laws. The Federal Trade Commission artic-
ulated that the exchange of sensitive information prior to the clearance of the merger may amount to a
breach of the United States competition legislation. Several successful legal actions have been brought
in on this basis (see for example FTC Watch No. 265, at 3; 232-233, and the Case United States v.
Input/Output, Inc. and Laitram Corp., 1999 WL 1425404, at *1 ).
6A common corporate culture is defined as holding similar assumptions and views among organisational
members, facilitating communication and action (Kreps [18])
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tion (Larsson and Finkelstein [19]).7 In particular, we assume that if the diﬀerences have
not been reduced at all by the end of the post-merger process, the opportunity costs of
merging will not be compensated for.
And third, post-merger eﬀorts show strategic uncertainty. In many circumstances it
is intrinsically hard to describe the desired actions in suﬃcient detail to distinguish them
from seemingly similar actions with very diﬀerent consequences (Mailath et al. [20]). We
thus argue that integration eﬀorts are neither ex ante nor ex post contractible. Further,
managers will not change behaviour after observing some of the partner’s actions and
integration decisions are modelled as simultaneous.8 We concentrate on the case where the
more one adapts, the more beneficial it becomes for the partner to adapt. As recognised
in the management literature, this describes best a post-merger relationship. Stahl et al.
[29] for example argue that, in any type of merger and acquisition, all partners need to
exert eﬀort to win the trust of the others and to foster integration eﬀorts. In our model,
this is equivalent to eﬀorts being strategic complements, i.e. a merging partner has more
incentives to integrate when it assigns a higher probability that the other partners will
integrate.
We find a unique equilibrium and show that it may be optimal for a firm to agree
on merging and to abstain from exerting any integration eﬀort. The equilibrium decision
predicts that for intermediate expected synergies, a firm may merge and expect its partner
to do the necessary integration eﬀorts. If expectations were high, a firm would always
7If the units continue to diﬀer too much in their conventions, conflict and misunderstanding may
prevent the merged firm from realising its economic eﬃciency. The DaimlerChrysler Statement (1998)
explicitely recognises the issue: “There can be no assurance that integration, and the synergies expected to
result, will be achieved to the extent currently anticipated." Weber and Camerer [34] show experimentally
that performance can decline substantially after two diﬀerent cultures merge.
8Especially actions during the integration phase are likely to be plagued by misunderstandings, rein-
forcing ambiguity about what each other is doing (Vaara [31]). A director of DaimlerChrysler stated in
1998: “When you think about the complexity of integrating two large companies, you start understanding
the uncertainties involved. A gradual integration process can help to give each other time to know the
other side better. But, by doing so, you may lose momentum and a real opportunity to make radical
transformations." (DaimlerChrysler Case Study, Fachhochshule Mainz, 2003).
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want to integrate while for low expectations, it would not want to merge. Hence, if
all firms receive intermediate signals, merger failure may occur. This failure cannot be
avoided by post-merger communication. Each partner has incentives to overstate its
private signal, since it always prefers that the others exert integration eﬀorts, even when it
does not integrate. Under these conditions, credible communication cannot be supported
in equilibrium, as shown by Baliga and Morris [2].
Our analysis allows us to identify under which conditions merger failure actually occurs
and to predict when more failures should be expected. First, failures are more likely
when opportunity costs of merging are lower. Firms merge more because it is cheaper
and integrate less because the partner’s merger acceptance gives a less positive signal.
Harford [14] and Schleifer and Vishny [28] find evidence that more mergers take place
when transaction costs are lower, and that this is typically observed during an economic
boom. Our results show that lower costs not only induce more mergers, but also relatively
more failures, consistent with the empirical evidence in Harford [14] and Gugler at al. [12]
of more failures occurring during economic booms.
Second, there are less failures if the penalty rises when not reaching a fully integrated
company. A higher penalty increases the incentives to integrate at the post-merger stage.
It might thus well be that company diﬀerences and divergent management styles cre-
ate opportunities for merger success. This can explain the counterintuitive evidence of
Morosini et al. [22], who find a better merger performance for more distinct partners.9
And, even though no condition needs to be imposed on the precision of the signals to
have the possibility of merger failure, the precision does aﬀect the likelihood of a failure.
More noisy signals in the pre-merger stage induce a firm to rely too much on the good
news that the partner wants to merge. Thus, less precise information gathered in the
pre-merger stage leads to more failures.
A number of other explanations for why mergers fail have been proposed in the lit-
erature. Managers can be empire-builders and merge only to belong to a larger firm
9Chakrabarti et al. [10] detect this as well. Larsson and Finkelstein [19] discover a positive, although
not significant, relationship between cultural distance and organisational integration.
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(Berkovitch and Narayanan [5]). Indeed, managers do not necessarily maximise share-
holders’ utility, but their own, which is typically correlated with the size of their firm.
In our explanation, managers’ and shareholders’ interests are perfectly aligned and still
a dissatisfactory merger may occur. And, empire building doesn’t explain why relatively
more failures occur during booms.
Second, managers may overestimate the future performance of the merged entity be-
cause they are over-optimistic about the synergy gains - so-called “managerial hubris" - or
because they may not foresee post-merger diﬃculties.10’11 Fulghieri and Hodrick [11] link
synergies with agency problems in such a way that coordination problems and multiple
equilibria arise.12 If managers foresee that all partners concerned will take the necessary
actions to attain a workable merger, but end up in a situation where nobody makes any
eﬀort, a failure will occur. But, why the good outcome is thought to prevail a priori and
why the bad situation arises in the end is not clear. The whole decision process remains
a black box. In such a setup, one cannot predict the occurrence of merger failures in
function of the underlying parameters.13 In our paper, firms make rational choices at
each point in time and we succeed to explain why optimal actions may still lead to a
10In Banal-Estañol et al.[3] mergers may fail, because managers underestimate internal conflicts. Weber
and Camerer [34] report that subjects in the laboratory are not able to foresee the problems derived
from conflicting organisational cultures. Van den Steen [32] finds in a general context that diﬀering
priors among agents may lead to rational overoptimism about the likelihood of success of the actions
undertaken.
11There are other reasons for a non-profitable merger to occur. Fridolfsson and Stennek [30] show that
mergers may lead to lower profits if being an insider is better than being an outsider. Firms may merge
to preempt their partner from merging with a rival. Alternatively, since the net benefits of a merger are
uncertain, actual results may be worse than expected. This type of failure is a possibility in this paper.
However, failure due to organisational problems may appear well before uncertainty is realised.
12Agency conflicts may emerge from a more hierarchical structure of an organisation (Meyer et al.
[21]), from divisional rent seeking (Scharfstein and Stein [27]), or simply because of facing a more complex
organisation (Weber et al. [35]).
13As argued by Morris and Shin [23] in a general context, the apparent coordination problems are a
consequence of two simplifying modelling assumptions: payoﬀs are assumed to be common knowledge
and players are assumed to be certain about the others’ behaviour in equilibrium. Diﬀerent beliefs are
logically coherent and we end up in an indeterminacy because of self-fulfilling beliefs.
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merger failure.
The paper also expands the global games literature, started by Carlsson and van
Damme [8] and further developed by Morris and Shin [23]. In these type of games,
agents’ payoﬀs (the realised eﬃciency gains) depend on the action chosen by the other
agents (the integration eﬀort) and some unknown economic fundamental (the potential
synergy gains). Agents receive public and private signals that generate beliefs about the
economic fundamental and about the actions and beliefs of the other agents. Morris
and Shin [23] showed that this incomplete information game has a unique equilibrium
as long as the public signal is noisy enough. If the public signal becomes too precise,
coordination problems and multiple equilibria arise as in the complete information case.
In our setting, prior to the global game (the integration stage), there is the decision of
whether to participate (the merger decision) that allows players to update their beliefs
about the signals of the other players. As a consequence, uniqueness is only ensured when
the private signals are noisy enough. The decision to participate in the game makes part
of this private information public.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 links the public information version of our model with some of the previous
explanations of merger failures. Section 4 presents our explanation of merger failures
using the case in which all information is kept private. Section 5 performs comparative
statics and Section 6 extends to the general case where part of the information is shared
and part is private. Section 7 concludes. In Appendix A we provide some preliminaries
for the proofs, which are relegated to Appendix B.
2 Model
Consider two risk-neutral firms with distinct corporate cultures. Both examine the pos-
sibility to merge. If the merger does not occur, each of them will earn the deterministic
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stand-alone profits πs > 0.14 Merging profits, on the other hand, are uncertain. Indeed,
they depend on the combination’s uncertain potential synergy gains, θ ∈ R, and on the
extent to which these gains will be actually realised in the post-merger integration process.
Accordingly, the merging profits for each, gross of merging and integration costs, can be
written as πm(fθ), where f ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of fulfillment of the potential
synergy gains and πm(·) is an increasing function. We consider thus a merger of equals,
whereby profits are shared equally. Each firm needs to pay a fixed cost k for merging and
may have to incur further integration costs t during the post-merger process.
We analyse the merger process by using a four-stage game. In the pre-merger period
(first stage), both firms collect information about the potential synergy gains. In the
merger period (second and third stages), firms decide whether to merge. In the second
stage, the firm denoted as Firm 1 decides whether to propose a merger to the other firm,
Firm 2, that can accept or reject in the third stage.15 If both agree to merge, then in
the post-merger period (fourth stage), each decides whether to exert an integration eﬀort.
Finally, the synergy gains and therefore the profits from merging are realised. The timing
of the game is described in Figure 1.
-
PRE −MERGER
Stage 1 :
Information
collection
MERGER
Stage 2 :
Firm 1 decides
if propose
Stage 3 :
Firm 2 decides
if accept
POST −MERGER
Stage 4 :
Each decides
if integrate
Realisation
synergy gains
Figure 1: Timing of the Game.
In the first stage, both firms collect information about the potential synergy gains.
14Past and current profits give a reasonably accurate idea of profits in the immediate future if the
market structure does not change.
15Merger decisions are modeled as sequential decisions to avoid the equilibrium where both firms decide
not to merge for any level of gains. This equilibrium appears only when firms take the merger decision
at exactly the same point in time.
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Before any information gathering, the synergy gains are completely uncertain and there-
fore θ is a priori randomly drawn from the real line, with each realisation equally likely.16
Collected information can be classified into public, available to both firms, and private,
available to only one. The knowledge that becomes available to both firms is assumed to
be summarised in a noisy, public signal of the true synergies,
y = θ + υ. (1)
Parameter υ represents the noise and we presume υ ∼ U(−l, l), and υ and θ to be inde-
pendent. The information derived from non-shared research and knowledge is summarised
into two noisy private signals of the true synergies,
xi = θ + εi for i = 1, 2, (2)
where εi represents the noise. It is assumed that the εi are i.i.d. with εi ∼ U(−l, l) and εi
and θ, εi and υ are independent. For simplicity, we set the three signals equally precise.
In the second stage, Firm 1 decides whether to propose to Firm 2. Equivalently, Firm
1 is the first firm to publicly announce whether it agrees to merge.17 It uses the available
information, Im1 ≡ {x1, y}, to update its beliefs about the potential synergy gains, (θ | Im1 )
and its beliefs about the private signal received by Firm 2, (x2 | Im1 ). If Firm 1 decides
not to propose, both firms obtain the stand-alone profits, πs, and the game ends. If it
decides to propose, then it is Firm 2’s turn to respond.
In the third stage, Firm 2 decides whether to accept or reject the proposal, based on its
available information Im2 ≡ {x2, y, Firm 1 agreed to merge}. It can reject and terminate
the game, resulting into the stand-alone profits πs for each firm. If on the other hand,
Firm 2 accepts, the merger takes place. Each firm pays the merging costs k and becomes
16The assumption that θ is uniformly distributed on the real line is non-standard but presents no
technical diﬃculties. Such “improper priors” with infinite mass are well behaved as long as we are
concerned only with conditional beliefs. See Hartigan [15] for a discussion on improper beliefs. An
improper belief is the same as assuming that the prior distribution of θ becomes diﬀuse.
17We will show that the order in which firms announce their decision does not matter. It would be
therefore equivalent to assume that only proposals or acceptances are observed.
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a unit of the new entity.18 The two units enter then into the post-merger process.
In the fourth stage, based on the information available, Ipi ≡ {Imi , Firm j agreed to
merge}, each unit decides simultaneously whether to exert an integration eﬀort in order
to adapt towards the other’s culture. We assume that the cultures at the beginning, CB1
and CB2 , as well as the cultures at the end, C
A
1 and C
A
2 , can be represented on the real
line. Unit i can change at a cost t its initial culture for the intermediate one
CAi =
⎧
⎨
⎩
CBi if ei = 0
CB1 +C
B
2
2
if ei = 1,
where ei = 1, 0 represents whether it exerts eﬀort.19
Realised synergy gains depend on the similarity of the cultures at the end of the
integration process and hence on the distance between CA1 and C
A
2 , f
¡¯¯
CA1 − CA2
¯¯¢
, where
¯¯
CA1 − CA2
¯¯
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if e1 = e2 = 1
|CB1 −CB2 |
2
if e1 6= e2¯¯
CB1 − CB2
¯¯
if e1 = e2 = 0.
More disparate cultures lower the extent of the synergy gains obtained, f(·) is decreasing.
Given that we model integrating as a binary decision, there are three scenarios. When both
partners adapt towards each other, f(0) = 1 and synergy gains are not discounted. If only
one partner integrates, the discount factor is f
µ |CB1 −CB2 |
2
¶
, which for expositional ease
we denote as f
µ |CB1 −CB2 |
2
¶
≡ 1d , where d > 1. Finally, when no one does an integration
eﬀort, we let the penalty to be extremely high, f
¡¯¯
CB1 − CB2
¯¯¢
= 0, and zero merger gains
are obtained.20 The uncertain gross payoﬀs for each firm are represented in Table (3).
18We assume that both the costs of merging and the stand-alone profits are certain. Results would not
change if these were random, as long as expected values are the same for both firms.
19The intermediate point is the natural choice when firms are symmetric. Note that an alternative
approach is to assume that partners can change their culture for another one that belongs to the interval
CAi ∈
h
CBi ,
CB1 +C
B
2
2
i
. Given the linearity of the model, this is equivalent to the current approach since
the optimal integration decision would be a corner solution.
20To fully discount the potential synergies if none does any integration eﬀort is just a normalisation.
Alternatively, we could substract the discounted expected synergies from the costs of merging and obtain
the same results.
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Integrate Not integrate
Integrate πm(θ)− t , πm(θ)− t πm( θd)− t , πm(
θ
d)
Not integrate πm( θd) , π
m( θd)− t πm(0) , πm(0)
(3)
We assume that k + πs > πm(0). Then, if the merger goes ahead but no unit does an
integration eﬀort, the profits from merging do not cover the opportunity costs of merging,
independently of the realisation of θ.
Definition 1 If both firms agree to merge but none does any integration eﬀort, the merger
is a sure failure.
For simplicity, we let πm(fθ) = fθ and normalise the integration costs t to 1. Then,
the sure failure assumption is satisfied, since k + πs > 0. Further, eﬀorts are strategic
complements if and only if d > 2.
3 Public Information and Previous Explanations
To relate our model with previous work, suppose first that firms receive only a public
signal y. Therefore,
E1(θ | Im1 ) = E2(θ | Im2 ) = E1(θ | Ip1 ) = E2(θ | Ip2 ) = y.
We solve the game by backwards induction. Simple algebra shows that if the expected
synergy gains are low, y < min{d, dd−1}, not integrating is a dominant strategy for both
firms. Anticipating the outcome of the integrating process, both firms prefer not to incur
the opportunity cost of merging, k + πs, and call oﬀ the merger.
Suppose on the other hand that synergy gains are high, y > max{d, dd−1}. Merging
units adapt then towards each other’s culture since this is a dominant strategy. Anticipat-
ing, firms compare in turn the expected benefits of merging (y− 1) with the opportunity
costs of merging k + πs and agree to merge if and only if y − 1 − k − πs ≥ 0. A first
source of failure (“bad luck failure") may occur. If the realised synergy gains are lower
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than expected and do not compensate the merger and integration costs, the merger is
unsuccessful.
Take finally the intermediate case, min{d, dd−1} < y < max{d, dd−1}. No dominant
strategy exists. Moreover, coordination problems arise and the game has two pure strategy
Nash equilibria.21 If d > 2, units’ actions are strategic complements. A high discount
factor induces a firm to incur the integration costs only when it beliefs that its partner
integrates. The two partners integrating and none integrating are both Nash equilibria.
Units have a mutual interest in reaching one equilibrium. The notion of Nash equilibrium
however does not rule out the inferior equilibrium of none integrating.22
This indeterminacy is even more problematic when one goes backwards to the merger
stage. At the moment of taking merger decisions, firms do not know in which equilibrium
of the integration process they are going to coordinate. This has been used as another
possible explanation of a merger failure (“irrational failure"). Both firms may agree to
merge, the argument goes, expecting that they are going to reach the good equilibrium,
but for some reason end up in the bad one.23
If firms are rational, the game has two Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria. In the first,
both firms merge and both integrate and in the second, none of them merges or integrates.
Our discussion in this section can be summarised in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 When all information about uncertain synergy gains is shared among merger
partners, a merger failure can only occur because of irrationality or bad luck.
In the following section, we present our explanation of merger failures. The key element
21There also exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Throughout the paper however we concentrate
on pure strategy equilibria.
22In the other case where d ∈ (1, 2], integration decisions are strategic substitutes. Since the discount
factor is low, a firm prefers not to incur the integration costs when it beliefs that its partner integrates.
Two equilibria arise: one partner, but not the other, does integration eﬀorts and vice versa. But, as argued
in the introduction, we concentrate on the case where integration decisions are strategic complements.
23Notice that this type of failure occurs for any realised value of the synergies. This never occurs in the
case of strategic substitutes. For both Nash equilibria, there is one firm that does an integration eﬀort
and the merger is not a sure failure.
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of our explanation is the introduction of asymmetric information.
4 Private Information and Rational Merger Failures
In the previous section, we assumed that all the information collected by the merging
firms was shared. In practice this is rarely the case. Firms often hide at least part of their
information.24 In the rest of the paper, firms hold some private information. In addition
to add reality to the model, we find a unique equilibrium. This is not only of theoretical
interest. It also allows us to perform comparative statics.
To simplify our discussion, we consider first the case in which firms receive only a
private signal. A strategy in this setting does not consist of two binary decisions as in the
public information case, but in a mapping from the range of possible signals to those two
binary choices.25
Definition 2 A strategy si for Firm i, i = 1, 2, is a function specifying, for each possible
private signal xi ∈ R, an action
s1 : R→ [{Propose, Not propose} , {Integrate, Not integrate}] and
s2 : R→ [{ Accept, Not accept } , {Integrate, Not integrate}] .
We concentrate on monotonic strategies, which in binary choice settings is equivalent
to the class of switching strategies. Depending on whether the signal is below or above
a cutoﬀ point, the player takes one action or the other. In our case, since we have two
decisions, a strategy is uniquely defined by two cutoﬀ points.
24Brusco et al. [7] identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the implementability of incentive-
eﬃcient mechanisms when eﬃciency gains are not dependent on post-merger actions. Their results,
however, cannot be directly applied here because firms’ revelation of information would aﬀect their post-
merger actions and therefore the extend of the synergy realisation.
25Remember that Firm 2 only decides whenever Firm 1 has proposed. Similarly, the two firms have
only to decide upon integrating whenever both firms have agreed to merge. This means that strategies
are fully defined without specifying the action of the other.
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Definition 3 A double switching strategy si for Firm i, i = 1, 2, with cutoﬀs exi and eexi
for merging and integrating respectively, can be described as
s1(x1) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
Propose iﬀ x1 > ex1
Integrate iﬀ x1 > eex1
and s2(x2) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
Accept iﬀ x2 > ex2
Integrate iﬀ x2 > eex2.
The sequential ordering introduces an informational asymmetry. The first-mover firm,
Firm 1, has to take the proposing decision without knowing whether Firm 2 will accept
or reject later on. The following lemma shows that in practice there is no asymmetry.
Lemma 2 When deciding wether to propose, Firm 1 decides as if it knew that Firm 2
were going to accept. As a result, both firms take the merger decision based on the same
information, Ii ≡ {xi, xj ≥ exj}, for i = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Firm 1’s decision is only relevant when Firm 2 accepts the merger because the stand-
alone profits do not depend on who rejects the merger. This is a realistic assumption if the
rejection of the merger does not provide any additional information about the individual
firm’s ability to compete in the product market. Since the information collected is about
the synergy gains from merging and the prospects of the combined entity, it is unlikely
that a rejection provides information.26 Given this result, we denote from now on for
expositional ease both the Propose and Accept decisions as Merge, and similarly Not
Propose and Not Accept as Not Merge.
From Table (3), if Firm j chooses a double switching strategy around (exj,eexj), Firm i
integrates whenever
g(xi, exj,eexj) ≡ E(θ | Ii) h1 + (d− 2)Pr ob³xj ≥ eexj | Ii´i− d ≥ 0. (4)
26If the asymmetry in information comes mainly from firms’ individual characteristics, this might not
be true. Hvidd and Prendergast [17] show how a failed takeover bid may increase the profitability of the
target by revealing that has low costs. In our framework, the only uncertainty comes from the synergies
and therefore from the profitability of the merger, not from the benefits of the separate entities.
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Intuitively, a higher private signal xi raises the expected synergies and the probability
that the partner integrates (remember that Ii ≡ {xi, xj ≥ exj}). Thus, Firm i integrates
more. Similarly, when Firm j is less prone to merge (exj is higher), its acceptance to merge
is a better signal for Firm i, inducing this firm to integrate more.
Condition (4) uniquely defines an integration cutoﬀ eexi for each double switching strat-
egy of the other firm (exj,eexj). Firm i integrates if and only if xi ≥ eexi. Hence, Firm i
already knows at the merger stage whether it is going to integrate later on. If Firm i
knows that it would integrate in the post-merger stage, it merges whenever
h
³
xi, exj,eexj´ ≡ E (θ | Ii) h1 + (d− 1)Pr ob³xj ≥ eexj | Ii´i− d(1 + k + πs) ≥ 0. (5)
Condition (5) uniquely defines a cutoﬀ exi for each double switching strategy of the other
firm (exj,eexj). Similarly, if Firm i knows that it would not integrate later on, it merges
whenever
m
³
xi,exj,eexj´ ≡ E(θ | Ii) Pr ob³xj ≥ eexj | Ii´− d(k + πs) ≥ 0. (6)
Given the symmetry of the model, we concentrate on equilibria in the class of sym-
metric strategies whereby partners i and j play the same double switching strategy,exi = exj ≡ ex and eexi = eexj ≡ eex. We proceed in three steps. In a first step, we pro-
vide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for double switching strategies to be symmetric
equilibria. In a second step, it is shown that, provided that the information gathered
carries some noise, there exists a unique equilibrium for each combination of the exoge-
nous parameters.27 In a last step, we find the unique equilibrium in function of these
parameters.
Lemma 3 : characterisation of the equilibrium.
A pair of cutoﬀs (ex, eex) is an equilibrium in symmetric switching strategies iﬀ
a) g(eex, ex,eex) = 0, h(ex, ex, eex) = 0 and ex ≥ eex or
b) g(eex, ex,eex) = 0,m(ex, ex,eex) = 0 and ex ≤ eex.
27Uniqueness of equilibrium is not straightforward in our game. Although integration decisions are
strategic complements with respect to each other, merger and integration decisions are not. For a com-
prehensive analysis of games with strategic complementarities see Vives [33].
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An equilibrium in both stages is found by the intersection of the integration decision
function, implicitly defined by g(·) = 0, and either the “I-will-later-integrate" merger
decision function (h(·) = 0) or the “I-will-later-NOT-integrate" merger decision function
(m(·) = 0). The first intersection is an equilibrium if and only if in this intersection,
firms integrate for a larger range of private signals than they merge (ex ≥ eex). Indeed,
if the private signal is higher than the integration cutoﬀ (xi ≥ eex), a firm merges when
the private signal is higher than the merger cutoﬀ (xi ≥ ex). On the other hand, if the
private signal is lower than the integration cutoﬀ (xi < eex), the firm would never merge.
An intersection where eex > ex can never be an equilibrium. When the private signal is
below the integration cutoﬀ (xi < eex), the “I-will-later-integrate" merger function is not
defined. The same reasoning holds for the other intersection.
The next step is to show that when the private signal has enough noise there exists
a unique pair that satisfies (a) or (b) of the previous lemma, and therefore there exists a
unique equilibrium.
Proposition 1 : Existence and Uniqueness of the equilibrium.
If l ≥ l∗ ≡ 3d(d−2)
2(d−1)2 , there is a unique equilibrium in symmetric switching strategies
(ex,eex).
The merger decision of each firm transforms part of its private information into public.
Public information has a “multiplier eﬀect" on all actions, because both firms know that
the partner received the same information. Public signals, therefore, play a role in coordi-
nating outcomes that exceeds the information content. Thus, the problem of self-fulfilling
beliefs arises again. This is a feature that keeps on returning in global games literature
(see Morris and Shin [23]). The particular feature here however is that the private signal
becomes partly public through the merger decision. Thus, in order to have uniqueness,
we need to have some noise on the private signal. We are now able to characterise this
unique equilibrium in function of the parameters of our model.
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Proposition 2 : Equilibrium.
Defining x∗ ≡ dd−1 −
l
3
, the symmetric switching equilibrium (ex, eex) satisfies:
a) If k + πs = 1d−1 then ex = x∗ = eex.
b) If k + πs > 1d−1 then ex > x∗ > eex.
c) If k + πs < 1d−1 then ex < x∗ < eex.
First, for a special case of the exogenous parameters, merger and integrating decisions
are the same. Firms find it profitable to merge in the same cases where they optimally
integrate (part a). Second, if the opportunity costs of merging are higher, then merging
becomes more expensive. As a direct consequence, firms merge less and the cutoﬀ from
merging is higher than before. Indirectly, since the acceptance of merging transmits a more
positive signal, firms integrate more easily than before and the cutoﬀ from integrating is
lower (part b). Finally, following the same reasoning, if the opportunity costs of merging
are lower firms merge more and integrate less (part c).
We are now ready to give our explanation of merger failures. In the next corollary we
describe when firms rationally choose to merge and not to exert integration eﬀorts.
Corollary 1 : Rational Merger Failures.
When all information about uncertain synergy gains is kept private among merger
partners, rational merger failures occur when
a) k + πs < 1d−1 , and
b) ex < xi < eex for i = 1, 2.
A rational merger failure can only occur if both firms choose to merge but not to
integrate. For this to happen, it is necessary that the merger decision is taken more
easily than the integration decision, i.e. in equilibrium one must have ex < eex. This occurs
when the opportunity costs of merging are low and/or the penalty of not being in a
common corporate culture is high, k + πs < 1d−1 (see Proposition 2). In order to have
then a de facto failure, it must be that the private signals received by both partners are
intermediate, ex < xi < eex for i = 1, 2. Both firms have gathered information about the
synergies, good enough to merge but not good enough to integrate. Both firms merge and
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expect the partner to do the integration eﬀorts. The merger goes ahead, but both choose
not to integrate, a merger failure independent of the realisation of the synergy gains.
If the private signal of at least one firm is below ex then the merger does not go ahead.
If, on the other hand, the signal of at least one of them is above eex, then there can be
only a failure because of a low realisation. Finally, if condition (b) is not satisfied and
k + πs ≥ 1d−1 , then ex ≥ eex and a rational merger failure cannot occur, since firms will
always integrate if they merge. We now turn to the comparative statics.
5 Comparative Statics
In the previous section, we showed that our game has a unique equilibrium in the class
of switching strategies if the private signal is not very precise. Here, we exploit this
property to analyse which situations should lead to more merger failures. We analyse
how the absolute and the relative probability of failure given θ varies with the exogenous
parameters of the model. To avoid uninteresting situations, we concentrate on the cases
where it is possible that firms merge (ex > θ− l) and where it is possible that they do not
integrate (eex ≤ θ + l). Notice that θ − l is the minimum possible signal firms can receive
and θ + l the maximum possible signal. The absolute number of failures is given by
Pr ob(ex < xi < eex | θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
min{eex, θ + l}−max{ex, θ − l} if ex ≤ eex
0 if ex > eex,
whereas the relative number of failures is given by
Pr ob(xi < eex | xi > ex, θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
min{eex,θ+l}−max{ex,θ−l}
θ+l−max{ex,θ−l} if ex ≤ eex
0 if ex > eex.
First, similar to the intuition provided for Proposition 2, lower opportunity costs of
merging lead to a less costly merger and firms therefore more easily merge. This also makes
that when the other firm has decided to merge, this yields less positive information. Thus,
expected synergies and the likelihood of the partner integrating become lower. Hence, the
firm is less prone on integrating. The distance between eex and ex becomes therefore greater
and the possibility of a failure higher, both in absolute and relative terms.
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Corollary 2 : Opportunity costs of merging.
Lower opportunity costs of merging (k+πs lower) lead to more mergers (ex lower) and
less integration (eex greater) and therefore to more failures, both in absolute and relative
terms.
The following figure shows as an example both cutoﬀs for the case in which d = 3
and l = 2, with k + πs varying from 0 to 1. For k + πs going from 0 to 0.5, ex < eex and
the possibility of failure exists. And, the lower k + πs, the bigger the range where failure
might occur.
10.8750.750.6250.50.3750.250.1250
1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5
k+p
cutoffs
Figure 2: Merging cutoﬀ ex (thick line) and integrating cutoﬀ eex (dotted line) as a function of the
opportunity costs of merging k + πs.
We now turn to the comparative statics with respect to the penalty factor d of not
fully integrating. Given the complexity of the expressions, we make use of simulation
techniques in Mathematica 4.0 to show some of the results.28 We let k + πs and l range
from 0 to 1000 and for every given combination {k + πs, l}, we let d vary from 2 to dmax,
where dmax is defined as l = l∗(dmax) in order to ensure uniqueness. We find that for each
combination of parameters {k + πs, l}, an increasing d leads to a decrease in eex and an
increase in ex. The next figure shows as an example the cutoﬀs for {k + πs, l} = {0.3, 2}.
28All macros and simulation results of this and following exercises are available upon request.
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Figure 3: Merging cutoﬀ ex (thick line) and integrating cutoﬀ eex (dotted line) as a function of the
penalty factor d of not fully integrating.
We state findings in the following result.
Result 4 : Penalty factor of not fully integrating.
A higher penalty factor (d greater) leads to less mergers (ex greater) and more integra-
tion (eex lower), and therefore less rational failures, both in absolute and relative terms.
A higher penalty factor punishes more non-integration. Thus, if firms merge, they
are going to more easily integrate. This has as consequence that a Firm i gives a higher
probability that its partner will integrate in the post-merger stage. This first eﬀect induces
firms to merge more. There is however a stronger eﬀect that goes in the opposite direction.
Even though they end up less often in a not fully integrated company, the losses when
this happens are higher. As a consequence, firms merge less and integrate more, and thus
the possibility for a rational failure becomes smaller.
We finally turn to the eﬀects of having less precise information. This is potentially an
important aspect of mergers, since firms often speed up the information gathering process,
which leads to less precise information. Again, we computed cutoﬀs for diﬀerent values of
the exogenous parameters. We let k + πs range from 0 to 1000 and d from 2 to 1000 and
for every pair {k + πs, d}, we let l vary from l∗ to 1000, in order to ensure uniqueness.
We find that for each combination {k + πs, d}, an increasing l leads to a slower decrease
in eex than the decrease in ex and thus a larger distance between eex and ex. Figure 4 shows
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as an example the cutoﬀs for {k+πs, d} = {0.25, 3} and l ranging from l∗ = 1.125 to 3.5.
3.53.2532.752.52.2521.751.5
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cutoffs
Figure 4: Merging cutoﬀ ex (thick line) and integrating cutoﬀ eex (dotted line) as a function of the noise l
of information.
We state findings in the following result.
Result 5 : Information precision.
Less precise information (l greater) leads to more mergers (ex lower) and more inte-
gration (eex lower), but to more failures in absolute terms.
A less precise private signal makes each partner to rely more on the positive signal
of the other having merged, when taking integration decisions. This increases the beliefs
of a post-merger integration of the partner. Consequently, partners integrate more and,
anticipating this, firms merge more. However, since their decisions are based on less
information, they lead to more failures.
6 Private and Public Information
In this section we briefly consider the case in which firms receive a private and a public
signal before merging. The introduction of a public signal y along with the private signals
(xi and xj) does not alter significantly the results of the previous section. Lemmas,
Propositions and Proofs can be restated in terms of the two types of information. The
uniqueness condition, however, is somewhat more complex and is defined in Appendix B.
Nevertheless, noisy enough signals are again suﬃcient to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium.
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Proposition 3 : Extension to private and public information.
There exists a unique l∗∗ such that if l ≥ l∗∗, there exists a unique symmetric equi-
librium in switching strategies (ex, eex). Defining r ≡ 3(y − dd−1) + l and x∗∗ ≡ y +
(6l−r)−
√
(6l−r)2+8lr
2
, the equilibrium is:
a) If k + πs = 1d−1 then ex = x∗∗ = eex.
b) If k + πs > 1d−1 then ex > x∗∗ > eex.
c) If k + πs < 1d−1 then ex < x∗∗ < eex.
Again merger failures can occur when the opportunity costs of merging are low and
the actual signals are intermediate. Similar comparative statics can be performed for this
case and the results are analogous.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel explanation of why mergers fail, based on pre-merger gath-
ering of information and post-merger integration problems. Rational managers acting in
the interest of shareholders may still lead their firms into merger failures. We show that
a firm may agree to merge and abstain from putting forth any integration eﬀort, counting
on the partner to adapt. If the two partners follow the same course of actions, the merger
goes ahead but fails. The new company does not forge the minimum progress towards a
common corporate culture, which is necessary to benefit those synergy gains that would
at least cover the merging opportunity costs.
We identify under which conditions mergers are more likely to fail. Lower merging
costs not only induce firms to merge more but also to integrate less. Failures should
therefore be more likely both in absolute and relative terms when transaction costs are
lower, which is the case in economic booms. Our explanation, thus, is consistent with the
empirical observation that there are relatively more failures during booms.
Further, a lower penalty for not fully integrating makes merging partners less willing
to integrate, resulting in more failures. There is empirical evidence partners with a larger
cultural diﬀerence perform better. There is, however, no conclusive evidence. When
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partners are a priori more dissimilar, not only the penalty becomes higher, but also
the cost of integrating itself, which is a constant in our model. Both eﬀects pull in
opposite directions and their eﬀect on failures cannot be predicted. However, there is
experimental evidence in an analogue complete information setup. Battalio et al. [4]
show in a coordination game that when the payoﬀ increases of the situation "I-don’t-
cooperate-and-you-cooperate", then players coordinate less frequent on the best outcome
of both cooperating.
Finally, having less precise information on potential synergy gains leads to more fail-
ures: firms rely too much on the good news of the partner’s positive decision to merge.
There is anecdotal evidence that merger failure is more eminent when potential partners
spend too little time on information gathering. But systematic empirical testing is dif-
ficult. Potential partners keep the starting point of merger talks secret. It is possible
to incorporate this in a merger experiment, modifying, for example, the experiments of
Weber et al. [34].
Our reasoning can be extended to asymmetric mergers, whereby the smaller partner
may need to adapt more to the larger one than vice versa. As long as both units need
to exert some eﬀort to make the merger work, they may find it optimal to merge and try
to free-ride on each other after the merger. We believe that in all cases, even in a pure
takeover, the acquiring firm needs to adapt itself minimally towards the target to reach a
workable entity.
Appendix A: Beliefs
Synergy gains
If θ is a random variable with an improper distribution and firm i receives a private
signal xi = θ + εi, where εi ∼ U(−l, l) with εi and θ independent, we have that θ | xi ∼
U(xi−l, xi+l). If firms also receive a public signal y such that y = θ+υ with υ ∼ U(−l, l),
and θ and υ, and εi and υ are independent, then, since θ | xi and υ are uniform, (θ | xi)
| (y | xi) is also uniform, θ | y, xi ∼ U(min{y, xi}+ l,max{y, xi}− l).
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Other’s signal
Firm i does not observe firm j’s private signal, xj, but knows that xj = θ + εj where
εj ∼ U(−l, l) and εj and θ, εj and εi are independent. Since θ | xi and εj are uniforms,
we know that xj | xi is a sum of uniforms, which results in a distribution function with
density function,
f(xj | xi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
xj−xi+2l
(2l)2 if xj ∈ [xi − 2l, xi]
xi+2l−xj
(2l)2 if xj ∈ [xi, xi + 2l],
and we can obtain Pr ob
³
xj ≥ eexj | xi, xj ≥ exj´ = Pr ob(xj≥eexj |xi)Pr ob(xj≥exj |xi) . Similarly, if the firms
receive a public signal, since θ | y, xi and εj are uniforms, we know that xj | y, xi is again
a sum of uniforms, which results in a distribution function with density function,
f(xj | xi, y) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
xj−(max{y,xi}−2l)
2l(2l−(max{y,xi}−min{y,xi})) if xj ∈ [max{y, xi}− 2l,min{y, xi}]
1
2l if xj ∈ [min{y, xi},max{y, xi}]
min{y,xi}+2l−xj
2l(2l−(max{y,xi}−min{y,xi})) if xj ∈ [max{y, xi},min{y, xi}+ 2l],
and from here we can obtain Pr ob
³
xj ≥ eexj | xi, xj ≥ exj, y´ = Pr ob(xj≥eexj |xi,y)Pr ob(xj≥exj |xi,y) .
Merger Updating
We can find θ | xi, xj ∼ (θ | xi) | (xj | xi) which is a uniform again, because xj | xi
is a sum of two uniform distributions and (θ | xi) is a uniform. We have then θ |
xi, xj ∼ U [min{xi, xj} + l,max{xi, xj} − l}]. From here, we can obtain E(θ | xi, xj ≥exj) = Rxj≥exj Rθ θf(θ|xi,xj)dθdxjPr ob(xj≥exj |xi) . Similarly, if the firms receive a public signal, θ | xi, xj ∼
U [min{xi, xj, y}+ l,max{xi, xj, y}− l}] and E(θ | xi, xj ≥ exj, y) = Rxj≥exj Rθ θf(θ|xi,xj ,y)dθdxjPr ob(xj≥exj |xi,y) .
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2
Firm 10s payoﬀ from proposing the merger depends on the probability that Firm 2 agrees
to merge. From the Law of Total Expectations, we can write Firm 1’s payoﬀ by proposing
the merger as [E(πm(·) | Im1 , x2 ≥ ex2)− k] Pr ob(x2 ≥ ex2 | Im1 ) + πs Pr ob(x2 < ex2 | Im1 ).
Firm 1 agrees to propose as long as this expression is greater than πs which, simplifying,
amounts to the condition E(πm(·) | Im1 , x2 ≥ ex2)− k ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 3
First take a pair (ex, eex) that satisfies part (a) (the same arguments apply for (b)). Suppose
that firm j is using this switching strategy with cutoﬀs (ex, eex). From (4) and by definition
of (ex, eex), firm’s i best response is to use, in the integration stage, a switching strategy
with cutoﬀ eex. Suppose first that firm i receives a private signal xi below eex. Knowing that
it is not going to integrate, we show that it is not going to merge, that is m(xi, ex,eex) < 0.
Since m() is an increasing function of xi we have then that m(xi, ex, eex) < m(eex, ex, eex). By
definition of g, h and m, we have that m(eex, ex,eex) = h(eex, ex,eex) − g(eex, ex, eex). By definition
g(eex, ex,eex) = 0 and since h() is an increasing function in xi and h(ex, ex,eex) = 0, it is true
that h(eex, ex,eex) < 0. Hence, m(xi, ex,eex) < 0 and firm i does not want to merge. Suppose
secondly that firm i receives a private signal xi above eex. Then it is going to merge,
knowing that it is going to integrate whenever xi ≥ ex by definition of h().We have shown
that firm i is going to merge whenever its private signal is above ex.
We now show that a pair (ex0,eex0) that satisfies g(eex0, ex0,eex0) = 0 and h(ex0, ex0, eex0) = 0
but eex0 > ex0 is not an equilibrium. Suppose that firm j uses a switching strategy with
cutoﬀs (ex0,eex0). Firm’s i best response is to use a switching strategy with cutoﬀ eex0 in the
integration stage. Suppose that firm i receives a private signal xi = ex0− ε. Knowing that
it does not integrate, it will merge whenever m(xi, ex0, eex0) ≥ 0. But since m(xi, ex0,eex0) =
h(xi, ex0, eex0)−g(xi, ex0,eex0) and g(xi, ex0,eex0) < 0 and h(xi, ex0,eex0) is arbitrarily close to 0 when
ε tends to 0, m(xi, ex0,eex0) > 0 and it will merge. Then ex0 cannot be a cutoﬀ point.
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Proof of Proposition 1
From (4), we have
g(eex, ex, eex) = E(θ | eex, xj ≥ ex) h1 + (d− 2)Pr ob³xj ≥ eex | eex, xj ≥ ex´i .
Clearly, E(θ | eex, xj ≥ ex) and Pr ob(xj ≥ eex | eex, xj ≥ ex) are increasing functions of ex
and therefore g(eex, ex, eex) is also increasing in ex. As shown in Appendix A, we can obtain
for the uniform distribution that if eex ≥ ex,
g(eex, ex,eex) = 6eex(2l)2 − (ex+ 2eex− l)(ex− eex+ 2l)2
6(2l)2 − 3(ex− eex+ 2l)2
"
1 + (d− 2) 2 (2l)
2
2 (2l)2 − (ex− eex+ 2l)2
#
,
whereas if eex < ex,
g(eex, ex, eex) = 2eex+ l + ex
3
(d− 1)− d.
We can show that when l ≥ 3d(d−2)
2(d−2)2 , then g(
eex, ex,eex) is also increasing in eex. By the
implicit function theorem, we get that eex, such that g(eex, ex, eex) = 0 is a decreasing function
of ex. Similarly we can show that h(ex0, ex0,eex0) and m(ex00, ex00, eex00) are increasing functions ofex0 and decreasing of eex0. Again by the implicit function theorem we have then that ex0 andex00, such that h(ex0, ex0,eex0) = 0 and that m(ex00, ex00,eex00) = 0, are decreasing functions of eex0
and eex00, respectively. Therefore there is a unique pair (ex,eex) such that g(eex, ex,eex) = 0 and
h(ex, ex, eex) = 0 and a unique pair (ex0,eex0) such that g(eex0, ex0,eex0) = 0 and m(ex0, ex0, eex0) = 0.
Suppose first that ex ≤ eex such that g(eex, ex, eex) = 0 and h(ex, ex, eex) = 0. This is by
definition an equilibrium and we need to show that (ex0,eex0) such that g(eex0, ex0, eex0) = 0 and
m(ex0, ex0,eex0) = 0 is not. Since g(eex, ex, eex) = 0 and h(eex, ex,eex) ≥ h(ex, ex, eex) = 0, we have that
m(eex, ex,eex) = h(eex, ex,eex)− g(eex, ex,eex) ≥ 0. Since eex(ex) such that g(eex, ex, eex) = 0 is a decreasing
function, the combination (ex0,eex0) such that g(eex0, ex0,eex0) = 0 and m(ex0, ex0,eex0) = 0 should
satisfy ex0 ≤ ex and eex0 ≥ eex. But then, since ex ≤ eex, then ex0 ≤ eex0 and therefore, from the
previous lemma (ex0,eex0) cannot be an equilibrium. If, secondly, ex > eex then (ex, eex) is not
an equilibrium by the previous lemma. However, following a similar reasoning as above
we can show that ex0 > eex0 and therefore (ex0,eex0) is an equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2
(a) Since E(θ | ex, xj ≥ ex) = 1d−1 and Pr ob(xj ≥ ex | ex, xj ≥ ex) = 1, we have that
when k + πs = 1d−1 , g(ex, ex, ex) = h(ex, ex, ex) = m(ex, ex, ex) = 0. Since, by the previous
proposition there is a unique equilibrium, we have that (ex, eex) is such that eex = ex is the
unique equilibrium, proving part a). In fact, it can easily be proven that eex = ex = dd−1− l3 .
(b) When k + πs > 1d−1 then h(ex, ex, ex) = m(ex, ex, ex) < 0 and following an argument
similar to the one presented in the proof of the previous proposition, we can show that
the equilibrium satisfies part a) in Lemma 3. On the other hand when k+ πs < 1d−1 then
h(ex, ex, ex) = m(ex, ex, ex) > 0 and then the equilibrium satisfies part b) in Lemma 3.
Proof of Corollary 1
Follows directly from Proposition 2.
Proof of Corollary 2
A lower k (or a lower πs) decreases h() and m() leaving g() constant. Therefore, by the
implicit function theorem and the proof of Proposition 2 that h() and m() are increasing
functions of ex, ex(eex, k + πs) such that h(eex0, ex0, eex0, k + πs) = 0 or m(eex0, ex0,eex0, k + πs) = 0
decreases with k + πs.Since eex(ex) such that g(eex, ex, eex) = 0 is a decreasing function of ex,
we have that if (ex,eex) satisfy g(eex, ex,eex) = 0 and h(eex, ex, eex, k + πs) = 0 and (ex0, eex0) satisfy
g(eex0, ex0,eex0) = 0 and h(eex0, ex0,eex0, k0 + πs0) = 0 for k0 + πs0 < k + πs then ex > ex0 and eex < eex0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Following the same procedure as in Section 4, we are going to obtain g(xi, exj, eexj, y),
h(xi, exj,eexj, y) and m(xi, exj,eexj, y). The same arguments of the proof of Lemma 3 apply
here and we need again to look for intersections of g(eex, ex,eex, y) and h(ex, ex,eex, y) when eex ≤ ex
and of g(eex, ex,eex, y) andm(ex, ex,eex, y) when eex ≥ ex. Except for the proof of g(eex, ex, eex, y) being
an increasing function of eex, all the other derivatives in the proof of Proposition 1 are
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exactly the same. The same arguments will, therefore, apply if we show that g(eex, ex, eex, y)
is increasing in eex.
Now instead of two, we have six diﬀerent orderings of (ex,eex, y). Substituting E() and
Pr ob() for the first case, in which ex ≥ eex ≥ y, we have that g(eex, ex, eex, y) = ex− 3dd−1+(2y+ l)
and eex in function of ex such that g(eex, ex, eex, y) = 0 would not be well defined. We need
thus that neither this case nor the case where eex ≥ ex ≥ y, appears. This occurs if
l ≥ l0 ≡ 3( dd−1 − y). If we substitute for the case in which ex ≥ y ≥ eex we have that
g(eex, ex,eex, y) = eex− 3d−(d−1)(l+ex)
2(d−1) and this is clearly increasing in
eex. If we substitute for the
case in which y ≥ ex ≥ eex we then have that g(eex, ex, eex, y) = (y+eex)(y−ex)+(eex+2l−y) (2eex+l+y)3
2(y−ex)+(eex+2l−y) − dd−1 .
This function is increasing in eex. If we substitute for the case in which y ≥ eex ≥ ex we then
have that g(eex, ex,eex, y) = 3(eex−y+2l)(eex+y)2l−(ex−y+2l)2(ex+2y−l)
12l(eex+2l−y)−3(ex−y+2l)2
h
1 + (d− 2) (y+2l−eex)(eex+2l−y)
4l(eex+2l−y)−(ex−y+2l)2
i
−
d. Computations show that, in this case, liml→∞
∂g
∂eex(eex, ex,eex, y, l) = ∞ and hence, there
exists l
00
such that if l ≥ l00 then g(eex, ex,eex, y, l) is increasing in eex. Similarly, there ex-
ists l
000
such that if l ≥ l000 then g(eex, ex,eex, y, l) is increasing in eex for the remaining case.
Summarising, if l ≥ l∗∗ ≡ max{l0 , l00 , l000} then g(eex, ex, eex, y) is an increasing function of eex.
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